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WILL ATHLETES EVER LEARN?: EXAMINING WAYS THE
NCAA HAS TRIED TO AND CAN DETER STUDENT-ATHLETES
FROM ACCEPTING EXTRA BENEFITS
I. A REVIEW SESSION
In the summer of 2010, the National Collegiate Athletic Associ-
ation (NCAA) issued its most severe penalties since 2002 to the Uni-
versity of Southern California (USC).1  The NCAA punished USC
after a four-year investigation into Reggie Bush, a former star run-
ning back at USC.2  The investigation revealed that Bush and his
family received extra benefits from a sports agent while Bush played
at USC.3  These actions violated the NCAA’s amateurism legislation,
Bylaw 12, and extra benefits legislation, Bylaw 16.4  As a result, the
NCAA sanctioned USC in 2010.5
An extra benefit is “any special arrangement by an institutional
employee or representative of the institution’s athletics interest to
provide a student-athlete or his/her family member or friend a ben-
efit not expressly authorized by NCAA legislation.”6  Accepting ex-
1. See Mary Elizabeth Kane, When The NCAA Strikes, Who is Called Out?, 7
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 119, 119–20 (2011) (explaining USC
endured NCAA punishment of 2010 and 2011 bowl bans, all victories in which
Bush participated vacated, and thirty scholarships eliminated over three years.)
2. See id. (discussing NCAA’s investigation of USC).
3. See Mark Yost, Schools for Scandals, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2010), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703453804575479663933878090 (dis-
cussing findings of NCAA investigation); see also infra notes 100–103 and accompa- R
nying text (discussing extra benefits Bush accepted while competing at USC).
4. See Report of the National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I Infractions
Committee, NCAA (May 26, 2011), available at http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/Pres-
sArchive/2011/Infractions/20110526_USC_Final_Public_Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TP79-HE7X] (acknowledging violations of NCAA Constitution and By-
laws by Reggie Bush); NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2015–16 NCAA DIVISION
I MANUAL, Bylaw 16.01.1 (2015), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/D116OCT.pdf [https://perma.cc/82M3-GSPA] [hereinafter
“NCAA MANUAL”] (setting out NCAA Bylaws); see NCAA MANUAL at Bylaw 12.1
(discussing eligibility requirements for student-athletes); see also infra notes
104–105 and accompanying text (discussing how Bush violated Bylaws 12 and 16). R
5. See Lynn Zinser, U.S.C. Sports Receive Harsh Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/sports/ncaafootball/11usc.
html?_r=0 (noting “harshest penalties stem” from Bush accepting improper bene-
fits); see also infra notes 106–109 and accompanying text (discussing sanctions im- R
posed on USC).
6. Nate Mink, What is an Extra Benefit, Other Key Words You May Read in NCAA
Report for Syracuse Case (Glossary), SYRACUSE.COM (last updated Mar. 6, 2015, 10:58
AM), http://www.syracuse.com/orangesports/index.ssf/2015/03/key_words_syra
cuse_ncaa_report_extra_benefit_penalty.html [https://perma.cc/2QH8-3JK8]
(111)
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tra benefits violates NCAA Bylaws.7  The NCAA created Bylaws 12
and 16 for the purpose of preventing such extra benefits.8  Bylaw 12
addresses the eligibility requirements student-athletes must meet in
order to maintain their amateurism status.9  A student-athlete loses
their amateurism and eligibility status under Bylaw 12 when they
accept extra benefits from agents.10  Bylaw 16 places limits on what
benefits a student-athlete can receive.11  Any benefit received by a
student-athlete that is not authorized by the NCAA is considered an
extra benefit, putting a student-athlete’s eligibility in jeopardy.12
In order to punish violators of these Bylaws, the NCAA created
the Committee on Infractions (“Committee”).13  The Committee
makes factual findings, concludes whether the institution violated
the NCAA Constitution and Bylaws, and imposes appropriate penal-
ties if a violation occurred.14  Prior to 2013, the Committee deter-
mined sanctions on a two-tiered penalty structure.15  In 2013, due
to criticism of the two-tiered penalty structure, the NCAA imple-
mented a four-tiered penalty structure to create clearer and stricter
(discussing terms used in Syracuse infractions case); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, R
at Bylaw 16.02.3 (defining extra benefit).
7. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaw 16.01.1 (acknowledging Bylaws R
prohibit extra benefits)
8. See id. at Bylaws 12.01, 16.02.3 (stating legislations implemented by NCAA
on member institutions).
9. See id. at Bylaw 12.1 (noting in order to maintain amateur status, student-
athlete must first be certified as an amateur and then must maintain their amateur
status through their time playing in college athletics).
10. See id. at Bylaw 12.1.2 (stating student-athlete loses amateur status if they
accept improper expenses, awards, and benefits); id. at Bylaw 12.02.1 (“An agent is
any individual who directly, or indirectly: [r]epresents or attempts to represent an
individual for the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation.”).
11. See id. at Bylaw 16.01.1 (noting accepting extra benefit can affect student-
athletes’ eligibility).  The NCAA Manual also lists permissible and impermissible
extra benefits. See id. at Bylaw 16.11.
12. See id. at Bylaw 16.01.1 (acknowledging if student-athlete accepts extra
benefit not authorized by NCAA legislation, student-athlete becomes ineligible in
sport in which extra benefit was received but if student-athlete receives extra bene-
fit not authorized by NCAA legislation, student-athlete is ineligible in all sports).
13. See id. at Bylaw 19.3.3 (discussing hearing panel constituting of not less
than five and not more than seven members on Committee of Infractions for
violations).
14. See id. at Bylaw 19.3.6 (stating the Committee cannot suspend or termi-
nate an institution’s NCAA membership for violating NCAA Constitution and
Bylaw).
15. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2012–13 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL,
Bylaw 19.02.2 (2012), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdown
loads/D113.pdf [https://perma.cc/S526-YQMW] [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL
2012–13] (noting violations categorized as major or secondary violations).
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penalties.16  However, the NCAA’s punishments and penalty struc-
tures may not deter student-athletes, as they continue accepting ex-
tra benefits.17
This Comment explores NCAA Division I extra benefit viola-
tions and whether previous sanctions imposed on institutions and
the penalty structure deter student-athletes from accepting extra
benefits.18  Section II highlights the history of the NCAA and ex-
plains the NCAA Bylaws.19  Section II also addresses the way in
which student-athletes are bound to the NCAA Constitution and
Bylaws.20  Section III first examines the two-tiered penalty structure
and how student-athletes continued to accept extra benefits despite
previous institutions being sanctioned and the penalty structure.21
Next, Section III discusses the change to the four-tiered penalty
structure and how student-athletes continued to accept extra bene-
fits despite previous sanctions on institutions and the new penalty
structure in place.22  Third, Section III discusses how agents are be-
ing regulated under the Uniform Athletes Agents Act (UAAA) and
the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA) and how
these acts do not deter agents from providing extra benefits to stu-
dent-athletes.23  Finally, Section IV concludes by discussing the next
16. See Gary Brown, Violator Beware: Penalties in New Enforcement Structure Pack a
Punch, NCAA (Jan. 9, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/
media-center/news/violator-beware-penalties-new-enforcement-structure-pack-
punch [https://perma.cc/WR8A-T86T] (discussing how four-tier penalty struc-
ture lays out consequences expected for violations).
17. See infra notes 72–173 and accompanying text (discussing how student- R
athletes at University of Wisconsin, University of Miami, USC, Syracuse University,
Wichita State, and University of Mississippi took extra benefits despite rules and
teams being punished previously).
18. See infra notes 72–173 and accompanying text (laying out extra benefit R
violations).
19. See infra notes 25–60 and accompanying text (discussing development of R
both the NCAA and rules that govern it).
20. See infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text (discussing how student-ath- R
letes are bound to NCAA rules).
21. See infra notes 66–119 and accompanying text (discussing how athletes at R
University of Wisconsin, University of Miami, and USC accepted extra benefits de-
spite rules in NCAA Constitution and Bylaws, violations they could endure under
two-tiered structure, and previous sanctions against teams).
22. See infra notes 120–174 and accompanying text (laying out change to four- R
tiered penalty structure and how student-athletes at Syracuse University, Wichita
State, and University of Mississippi took extra benefits despite rules in NCAA Con-
stitution and Bylaws, increased penalty structure, and previous sanctions against
teams).
23. See infra notes 175–238 and accompanying text (acknowledging how Uni- R
form Athlete Agents Act and Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act attempt to
regulate agents and how agents are not following rules).
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steps NCAA could take to deter student-athletes from accepting ex-
tra benefits and deter agents from providing extra benefits.24
II. A CRASH COURSE ON THE NCAA’S HISTORY
In 1905, after multiple deaths and injuries during college foot-
ball games, President Theodore Roosevelt sought a presidential in-
tervention to review collegiate football rules.25  This intervention
led to the creation of Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
United States (IAAUS) in 1906.26  In 1910, IAAUS was renamed the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).27  Initially, the
NCAA was formed to review college athletics rules; however, the
NCAA has expanded to creating and enforcing rules.28
The NCAA is a membership-driven organization dedicated to
implementing and enforcing rules to allow student-athletes to com-
pete in college athletics.29  The NCAA consists of 1,200 member
schools which are broken into three divisions: Division I, Division
II, and Division III.30  Division I schools generally have the largest
student bodies, the largest athletic budget, and the most scholar-
ships.31  This division consist of 300 colleges and universities, 6,000
24. See infra notes 239–248 and accompanying text (discussing how paying R
college athletes and NCAA working with agents may prevent student-athletes from
accepting extra benefits).
25. See Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 12 (2000)
(acknowledging history of NCAA).
26. See Kane, supra note 1, at 121 (noting IAAUS was created to reform col- R
lege football rules); see also Smith, supra note 25, at 12 (noting in 1905 “there were R
over eighteen deaths and one hundred major injuries” in college football).
27. See Kane, supra note 1, at 122 (discussing NCAA consisting of “four-year, R
post high-school colleges, universities, and other educational institutions”).
28. See id. (noting today, NCAA participates in educational program of col-
leges and college athletics); see also NCAA Sports Contracts and Amateurism, USLEGAL,
http://sportslaw.uslegal.com/sports-agents-and-contracts/ncaa-sports-contracts-
and-amateurism/ [https://perma.cc/4V7B-4RZ8] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016) (ac-
knowledging NCAA is “largest amateur organization in United States related to the
regulation of athletes”).
29. See About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about [https://
perma.cc/D4CN-82XA] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016) (discussing purpose of NCAA).
30. See Jean S. Frankel & Nancy Alexander, Pumped-Up Governance: Lessons from
the NCAA’s Restructuring, ASSOCIATIONS NOW (Feb. 1, 2015), http://association-
snow.com/2015/02/pumped-up-governance-lessons-from-the-ncaas-restructuring/
[https://perma.cc/Q8L8-XKEN] (acknowledging that each division has its own
board of directors, made up of regional athletic conferences, and stakeholders
such as athletic directors, coaches, faculty, and 460,000 student-athletes).
31. See NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=D1
[https://perma.cc/6KU9-8TS8] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016) (noting Division I is
subdivided based on football sponsorship).
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athletic teams, and 17,000 student-athletes.32  Division II is the divi-
sion below Division I; however, student-athletes are just as competi-
tive and skilled as Division I athletes.33  Compared to Division I
schools, Division II schools generally do not have the same financial
resources to devote to athletics.34  Division II consists of over 300
colleges and universities and thousands of student-athletes.35  Divi-
sion III is the bottom division in the NCAA, with student-athletes
primarily focusing on academics.36  Division III schools help stu-
dent-athletes focus on academics by having shorter practices and
playing seasons, thereby minimizing conflicts Division I and Divi-
sion II student-athletes may experience.37  Division III consists of
450 colleges and institutions and more than 18,000 student-
athletes.38
A. NCAA Constitution and Bylaws
Since the NCAA’s inception, it has been the rule-making body
for college athletics.39  The quality and quantity of rules have “im-
mensely grown and expanded since 1906.”40  The NCAA’s legisla-
tion, which governs the NCAA’s member institutions’ conduct, is
contained within the NCAA Constitution and Bylaws.41  The legisla-
tion covers many areas of college athletics including principles of
conduct, NCAA membership, ethical conduct, amateurism and ath-
letics eligibility, benefits, and enforcement.42
32. Id. (discussing Division I concept).
33. See About NCAA Division II, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division
=D2 [https://perma.cc/FP92-LQ3Y] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016) (acknowledging
Division II student-athletes are “recognized for their academic success, athletics
contributions and campus/community involvement”).
34. See id. (noting Division II offers a “partial-scholarship,” which is a “mix of
athletic scholarships, academic aid, need-based grants and/or employment
earnings”).
35. See id. (discussing background of Division II).
36. See NCAA Division III, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=D3
[https://perma.cc/5SAQ-TDXW] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016) (acknowledging Divi-
sion III student-athletes are “integrated on campus and treated like all other mem-
bers of the student body”).
37. See id. (discussing life of Division III student-athlete).
38. See id. (discussing makeup of Division III).
39. See Kane, supra note 1, at 122 (noting original purpose of NCAA was to R
create rules for college football).
40. Id. (discussing growth of NCAA through its history).
41. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Organization of the NCAA Manual (not- R
ing NCAA Constitution “consists of information relevant to the purposes of the
Association” and NCAA Bylaws are “to promote the principles enunciated in the
constitution and to achieve the Associations purposes”).
42. See id. at Const. arts. 1–6, Bylaws 10–22 (discussing composition of NCAA
Constitution and Bylaws).
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B. Governing the NCAA
In order to achieve its goals, the NCAA “is committed to en-
forcing the rules, creating fair competition, and establishing a posi-
tive competitive environment for student-athletes across the
country.”43  In order to uphold the integrity and fair play among
the NCAA membership and to impose appropriate and fair penal-
ties, the NCAA created the infractions program.44  The NCAA also
established a governance structure that “consists of a legislative bod-
ies . . . that govern each division . . . [and] committees that set
association-wide policy.”45
The Committee acts as the judge and jury for the infraction
process.46  It makes factual findings, concludes whether the institu-
tion violated the NCAA Constitution and Bylaws, and imposes ap-
propriate penalties if a violation occurred.47  The NCAA also
created an Infractions Appeals Committee to hear appeals from de-
cisions involving Level I and Level II violations.48  The Infractions
43. Fairness and Integrity, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/what-we-do/fair
ness-and-integrity [https://perma.cc/F2GF-DJR9] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016) (ac-
knowledging “[v]alues such as respect, caring, fairness, civility, honesty, integrity,
and responsibility are equally important on and off the field”).  For further discus-
sion on how the NCAA governs college athletics, see infra notes 43–49 and accom- R
panying text.
44. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaw 19.01.1 (acknowledging “ability R
to investigate allegations and penalize infractions is critical to the common inter-
ests of the Association’s membership and the preservation of its enduring values”).
45. Governance, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/governance [https://perma.cc/
AS5X-LWTV] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016) (noting legislative bodies consist of volun-
teers from member schools). The committees “manage topics affecting sports
rules, championships, health and safety, matters impacting women in athletics and
opportunities for minorities.”  Id.
46. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaw 19.3.1 (noting Committee is R
appointed by Board of Directors and consists of no more than twenty-four
members).
47. See id. at Bylaw 19.3.6 (discussing duties of Committee).  The Committee
also has a duty to
(d) Coordinate with the office of the Committees on Infractions as neces-
sary for logistic, administrative or other support related to implementa-
tion of the committee’s decisions;
(e) Monitor compliance with prescribed penalties . . .;
(f) Consider complaints alleging the failure of any member to maintain
the academic or athletics standards required for membership . . .;
(g) Formulate and revise internal operating procedures and revise inves-
tigative guidelines . . . ; and
(h) Carry out such other duties directly related to the administration of
the Association’s infractions programs.
Id.
48. See id. at Bylaw 19.4.1 (stating five members comprise Infractions Appeals
Committee).
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Appeals Committee has the authority to review the Committee’s
ruling and decide whether to overturn or affirm its decision.49
C. NCAA Amateurism: Bylaw 12
Amateur competition is the driving factor behind college ath-
letics and the NCAA.50  Amateurism rules ensure fair competi-
tion for all student-athletes.51  In order to keep professional sports
separate from college athletics, the NCAA only allows student-
athletes with amateur status to participate in college sports.52  A
student-athlete must follow the eligibility requirements under
Bylaw 12 in order to maintain their amateur status.53  A student-
athlete loses their amateur status if they accept transportation,
cash, entertainment, or other extra benefits from an agent
while competing in college athletics.54  However, this Bylaw is not
49. See id. at Bylaw 19.4.5.
The Infractions Appeals Committee shall:
(a) Consider appeals from decisions of a hearing panel of the Com-
mittee on Infractions involving Level I and Level II violations; [and]
(b) Affirm, reverse, or vacate and/or remand the panel’s findings,
conclusions, penalties, corrective actions, requirements, and/or other
conditions and obligations of membership prescribed for violations of
the NCAA constitution and bylaws[.]
Id.
50. See Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism [https://
perma.cc/R4MJ-AUDF] (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (discussing amateurism is “a
bedrock principle of college athletics and the NCAA”).
51. See id. (stating “all incoming student-athletes must be certified as
amateurs”).
52. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaw 12.01.1 (stating only athletes R
with amateur status are eligible for college athletics participation).
53. See id. at Bylaw 12.1 (noting general principles of maintaining amateurism
or situations in which student-athlete may lose amateur status).
54. See id. at Bylaw 12.1.2 (discussing how student-athlete loses amateurism
status).  A student-athlete loses their amateurism status if the student-athlete:
(a) Uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any
form in that sport;
(b) Accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following
completion of intercollegiate athletics participation;
(c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional ath-
letics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received,
except as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.5.1;
(d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses,
or any other form of financial assistance from a professional sports organ-
ization based on athletics skills or participation, except as permitted by
NCAA rules and regulations;
(e) Competes on any professional athletics team per Bylaw 12.02.11, even
if no pay or remuneration for expenses was received, except as permitted
in Bylaw 12.2.3.2.1;
(f) After initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a professional
draft; or
(g) Enters into an agreement with an agent.
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the only one to abrogate a student-athlete’s participation eligi-
bility.55
D. NCAA Extra Benefits: Bylaw 16
Bylaw 16 provides limitations of allowable awards, benefits, and
expenses student-athletes can accept while playing.56  A student-ath-
lete becomes ineligible when they accept an award, benefit, or ex-
pense not authorized by the NCAA legislation.57  An extra benefit is
“any special arrangement by an institutional employee or represen-
tative of the institution’s athletics interest to provide student-athlete
or the student-athlete family member or friend a benefit not ex-
pressly authorized by NCAA legislation.”58  Accepting extra benefits
violates NCAA rules.59  However, extra benefits are not a character-
ized violation if the benefit is available to general population or
student body.60
E. Student-Athletes Are Bound to NCAA Rules
All colleges, universities, athletic conferences or associations,
and other groups that are related to college athletics can be a mem-
ber of the NCAA.61  Colleges and universities choose to become a
member of the NCAA by applying and being elected into active
Id; see also NCAA Sports Contracts and Amateurism, supra note 28 (discussing evolution R
of amateurism); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaw 12.02.1 (“An agent is any R
individual who, directly or indirectly: [r]epresents or attempts to represent an indi-
vidual for the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation[.]”).
55. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaw 16 (stating how student-athlete R
can lose their eligibility status by accepting extra benefits).
56. See Keith Starr, The Path to Antitrust Success Against The NCAA Is More Lim-
ited than You Think, 79 MO. L. REV. 1157, 1171 (2014) (discussing extra benefits
given to student-athletes “because of their athletic ability”).
57. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaws 16.01.1, 16.02.1–16.02.3 (defin- R
ing award as “an item given in recognition of athletics participation of perform-
ance,” an excessive expense as “one not specifically authorized under regulations
of the Association concerning awards, benefits, and expenses,” and an extra bene-
fit as “any special arrangement by an institutional employee or representative of
the institution’s athletics interests to provide a student-athlete or student-athlete
family member or friend a benefit not expressly authorized by NCAA legislation”).
58. Id. at Bylaw 16.02.3 (defining extra benefit).
59. See id. (discussing extra benefit violations).
60. See id. (stating benefit is not characterized as violation “if it is demon-
strated that the same benefit is generally available to the institution’s students or
their family members or friends or to a particular segment of the student body . . .
determined on a basis unrelated to athletics ability”).
61. See id. at Const. art. 3.1 (noting colleges, universities, athletic conferences
or associations, and other groups must be accredited by one of six regional accred-
iting agencies and must be located in United States, its territories, or possessions).
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membership.62  When an active member, the institution must com-
ply with the NCAA’s Constitution and Bylaws and other legisla-
tion.63  As members, the institutions have the responsibility to
ensure their athletic programs, which include participating student-
athletes, are in compliance with the rules and regulations.64  A stu-
dent-athlete agrees to these rules by joining a member institution
and signing a Student-Athlete Statement each year.65
III. THE NCAA’S UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS ON PUNISHING EXTRA
BENEFIT VIOLATIONS
A. Two-Tiered Penalty Structure
Prior to 2013, the NCAA created and enforced a two-tiered
penalty structure.66  The Committee punished violators of the pen-
alty structure.67  Violations under this penalty structure would have
been characterized as a secondary or major violation.68  A secon-
dary violation was “a violation that [was] isolated or inadvertent in
nature, provide[d] or . . . intended to provide only a minimal
recruiting, competitive or other advantage and does not include
62. See id. at Const. art. 3.2.1 (stating institutions must apply and be elected to
active membership).
63. See id. at Const. art. 3.2.1.1 (acknowledging “[a]ctive membership is availa-
ble to four-year colleges and universities, accredited by the appropriate regional
accrediting agency . . .  and duly elected to active membership”).
64. See id. at Const. art. 6.01 (noting “[a]dministrative control or faculty con-
trol, or a combination of two, shall constitute institutional control”); see also Princi-
ples of Institutional Control, THE OFFICIAL ATHLETICS SITE OF GEORGE MASON, http://
www.gomason.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=25200&ATCLID=205072664
[https://perma.cc/H2KD-YQGB] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016) (discussing how to be
in compliance with NCAA institutional control rule).
65. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Const. art. 3.2.4.6 (noting all active R
member institutions must administer Student-Athlete Statement form annually);
Form 15-3a Academic Year 2015–16: Student-Athlete Statement – NCAA Division I,
NCAA, available at http://lehighsports.com/documents/2015/8/4//Form_15_3
a_Student_Athlete_Statement.pdf?id=1353 [https://perma.cc/EWE7-3JNE] (last
visited Mar. 22, 2016) (noting athletes must sign Student-Athlete Statement every
year agreeing to understanding NCAA rules in order to be eligible for collegiate
competition); see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaws 12.1.2, 16.01.1 (stat- R
ing extra benefits received from an agent affects eligibility).
66. See Note re: New NCAA Division I Enforcement Model, ICEMILLER LLP (Dec.
2012), https://www.nacwaa.org/sites/default/files/images/notes%20new%20
ncaa%20d1%20enforcement%20model%2012%202012-c.pdf [https://perma.cc/
96EN-QGNG] (discussing NCAA’s two-tiered penalty model).
67. See NCAA MANUAL 2012–13, supra note 15, at Bylaw 19.1 (stating Commit- R
tee was “responsible for administration of the NCAA enforcement program”).
68. See id. at Bylaw 19.02.2 (discussing two-tiered structure used by NCAA
prior to 2013).
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any significant impermissible benefit.”69  A major violation included
“[a]ll violations other than secondary violations.”70  However, de-
spite the NCAA, the Committee, and the penalty structure, athletes
continued to accept extra benefits.71
1. University of Wisconsin
From 1993 to 2000, the University of Wisconsin athletes ac-
cepted unadvertised shoe discounts from a local shoe store, The
Shoe Box.72  In what is now known as the University of Wisconsin
Shoe Box Scandal, investigators found that 157 athletes in fourteen
sports violated the NCAA Bylaws by accepting at least $23,000 in
unadvertised discounts.73  In some instances, athletes even ex-
changed university-issued athletics equipment for items in the
store.74  At least seven men’s basketball players, twenty-six football
players, and one women’s soccer player accepted discounts and sev-
eral did not pay back interest-free credit accounts at the store.75
These discounts and interest-free accounts were not available to
other students and thus a violation of the NCAA Bylaws.76  The
NCAA also found a booster provided transportation to two men’s
69. Id. (discussing violations “including, but not limited to, an extra benefit,
recruiting inducement, preferential treatment or financial aid”).
70. Id. (noting major violations include “extensive recruiting or competitive
advantage”).
71. See infra notes 72–119 and accompanying text (discussing student-athletes R
accepting benefits at University of Wisconsin, University of Miami, USC, and  Uni-
versity of Tennessee).
72. See Andy Hall, Shoe Scandal Ripple Through UW Athletics, THE JOURNAL TIMES
(Sept. 2, 2000), http://journaltimes.com/shoe-scandal-ripples-through-uw-athle
tics/article_5aa7b63d-898e-5fa2-8989-634619c9582b.html [https://perma.cc/
R86L-AXRQ] (noting football and basketball players were biggest recipients of dis-
count); see also Andy Baggot, Scandal All but Behind Badgers UW Will Come Off Proba-
tion for the Shoe Box Affair Tuesday, MADISON.COM (Oct. 1, 2006), http://host.madi
son.com/sports/scandal-all-but-behind-badgers-uw-will-come-off-probation/article
_3fe02600-81cc-565b-a90e-9204fbf7d051.html [https://perma.cc/B4CW-PYSN]
(discussing Shoe Box Scandal); University of Wisconsin, Madison Public Infractions Re-
port, NCAA (Oct. 2, 2001, 2:00 PM), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCase
View/report?id=102185 [https://perma.cc/98DX-K7US] [hereinafter Wisconsin
Infractions Report] (discussing official infractions decision by Committee).
73. Badgers Get Probation in Football, Men’s Hoops, ESPN (Oct.2, 2001), http://
espn.go.com/gen/news/2001/1002/1258244.html [https://perma.cc/55KA-
P2T2] (noting discounts ranged from twelve to fifty percent).
74. See Wisconsin Infractions Report, supra note 72 (discussing ways student-ath- R
letes received extra benefits).
75. See Hall, supra note 72 (noting all athletes were ordered to pay back value R
of their discounts to charity).
76. See id. (detailing extra benefit violations at University of Wisconsin); see
Wisconsin Infractions Report, supra note 72, at 5 (explaining “extension of credit was R
based upon their status as student-athletes”).
10
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basketball players on one occasion.77  Prior to the NCAA’s sanc-
tions, the University of Wisconsin self-imposed its own sanctions:
three years of probation, a $150,000 fine, and an exclusion of four
football and one men’s basketball scholarship.78
On October 2, 2001, the Committee determined this conduct
was a major violation of Bylaw 16 under the two-tiered penalty struc-
ture.79  Student-athletes violated Bylaw 16 when they accepted dis-
counts and interest free credit accounts from The Shoe Box that
were not available to the rest of the student body.80  In addition,
men’s basketball players violated Bylaw 16 when they accepted
transportation from a representative.81  Due to these violations, the
NCAA put Wisconsin on five years of probation and took away mul-
tiple football and basketball scholarships.82  The University of Wis-
consin’s punishment did not educate student-athletes at other
schools on punishment they would face when accepting extra bene-
77. See Wisconsin Infractions Report, supra note 72 (noting violation would usu- R
ally be considered secondary violation; however, violation was more serious be-
cause it indicated “an elevation of the relationship between athletics representative
and student-athlete”). The NCAA Manual defines a booster as an individual who is
known (or should have been known) by a member of an institution’s executive or
athletics administration to:
(a) Have participated in or to be a member of an agency or organization
promoting the institution’s intercollegiate athletics program;
(b) Have made financial contributions to the athletics department or to
an athletics booster organization of that institution;
(c) Be assisting or to have been requested (by the athletics department
staff) to assist in the recruitment of prospective student-athletes;
(d) Be assisting or to have assisted in providing benefits to enrolled stu-
dent-athletes or their families; or
(e) Have been involved otherwise in promoting the institution’s athletics
program.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaw 13.02.14. R
78. See Wisconsin Infractions Report, supra note 72 (noting school also banned R
players from shopping at The Shoe Box); see also Badgers Get Probation in Football,
Men’s Hoops, supra note 73 (acknowledging University of Wisconsin “banned ath- R
letes, coaches, and athletic administrators from shopping at the Shoe Box”).
79. See Baggot, supra note 72 (stating this was third major violation in eight R
years at University of Wisconsin).
80. See Wisconsin Infractions Report, supra note 72 (discussing ways student-ath- R
letes received extra benefits).
81. See id. (discussing ways student-athletes accepted extra benefits); see also
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaw 16.11.2.2(d) (acknowledging transportation R
is expressly prohibited).
82. See Badgers Get Probation in Football, Men’s Hoops, supra note 73 (acknowl- R
edging NCAA reduced number of football scholarships offered in 2002–2003 and
2003–2004 school year from twenty-five to twenty and cut one men’s basketball
scholarship in 2003–2004).  Notably, because of its self-imposed sanctions, Wiscon-
sin was not stripped of its 2000 Final Four appearance. See id.
11
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fits.83  In light of the deterrence the NCAA was trying to accom-
plish, theses punishments were not nearly enough to deter and
prevent extra benefits.84
2. University of Miami
Despite the NCAA’s education on the penalties student-ath-
letes will face for accepting extra benefits, it did not deter student-
athletes at the University of Miami from accepting extra benefits
from a booster and equipment manager from 2002 to 2010.85
Booster Nevin Shapiro provided student-athletes with meals, cash,
lodging, transportation, and entertainment.86  Shapiro provided
entertainment to student-athletes by hosting them at his home and
on his yacht, paying for their beverages, providing admissions into
nightclubs and strip clubs, and providing access to private rooms at
Miami-area nightclubs and strip clubs.87  In addition, Shapiro was
an investor in a sports agency and arranged meetings between stu-
dent-athletes and his partner, a registered sports agent.88  Also, act-
ing on behalf of the sports agency, Shapiro provided benefits to
encourage student-athletes to seek representation from the sports
agency.89  Student-athletes also accepted extra benefits from a for-
83. See Wisconsin Infractions Report, supra note 72 (discussing penalties imposed R
on University of Wisconsin); see infra notes 85–110 and accompanying text (discuss- R
ing extra benefits student-athletes accepted at University of Miami and USC).
84. See supra notes 72–82 and accompanying text (noting extra benefits stu- R
dent-athletes accepted).
85. See Badgers Get Probation in Football, Men’s Hoops, supra note 73 (discussing R
penalties imposed on University of Wisconsin and its student-athletes); see also infra
notes 86–91 and accompanying text (discussing extra benefits accepted by student- R
athletes at University of Miami); see, e.g., University of Miami Public Infractions Report,
NCAA (Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Miami Infractions Report], available at http://
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Miami%20Public%20Inf%20Rpt.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F5CD-U7ZE] (discussing University of Miami’s penalties imposed by
NCAA).
86. See NCAA Infractions Case, HURRICANE SPORTS (Dec. 13, 2013), http://
www.hurricanesports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=209340356 [https://
perma.cc/D8MA-HPD5] (discussing NCAA infractions case against University of
Miami); see also Charles Robinson, Renegade Miami Football Booster Spells Out Illicit
Benefits to Players, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug. 16, 2011, 5:37 PM), http://sports.yahoo.
com/news/renegade-miami-football-booster-spells-213700753—spt.html [https://
perma.cc/4DZN-GGGU] (acknowledging University of Miami booster, Nevin Sha-
piro, claimed he provided “thousands of impermissible benefits to at least seventy-
two athletes from 2002 to 2010”).
87. See Miami Infractions Report, supra note 85, at 35–41 (discussing extra bene- R
fits student-athletes received).
88. See id at 9, 19 (noting meetings “identifying and recruiting potential cli-
ents” took place over course of two to three years).
89. See id. at 38 (acknowledging booster tried to secure student-athletes as
clients for agency by providing meals and in one instance providing $50,000).
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mer equipment staff member when they accepted meals, entertain-
ment, and football gear.90  The coaches knew student-athletes
received extra benefits and in some instances even arranged for stu-
dent-athletes to receive them.91  Prior to the NCAA sanctions,
Miami imposed its own postseason ban for two seasons.92
The Committee determined, under the two-tiered penalty
structure, that this was a major infractions case; Miami’s student-
athletes violated both Bylaw 12 and 16.93  These Bylaws were vio-
lated when Shapiro, a booster and an investor in a sports agency,
arranged meetings between student-athletes and an agent and
bribed student-athletes with benefits to sign with his agency.94  Fur-
ther, Miami’s student-athletes violated these Bylaws when they ac-
cepted meals, cash, and entertainment.95  The NCAA placed Miami
on three years of probation.96  The football program lost nine
scholarships and men’s basketball program lost three for multiple
academic years.97  These extra benefits just continued to show why
90. See NCAA Infractions Case, supra note 86 (noting equipment manager pro- R
vided student-athletes extra benefits from 2007 to 2011).
91. See id. (noting University of Miami also reduced number of official visits by
twenty percent from 2012 to 2013, reduced fall evaluations from forty-two to thirty-
six from 2012 to 2013, and reduced available contact days by twenty percent from
2013 to 2014).
92. See Miami Infractions Report, supra note 85, at 3–4, 63 (discussing self-im- R
posed ban by Miami); see also Tim Daniels, Miami Hurricanes Sanctions Announced by
NCAA, BLEACHER REPORT (Oct. 22, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
1820323-miami-hurricanes-sanctions-by-ncaa-reportedly-revealed [https://
perma.cc/6NFA-RX72] (noting self-imposed bowl ban deterred NCAA from im-
posing a longer bowl ban).
93. See Miami Infractions Report, supra note 85, at 35–44, 46 (discussing viola- R
tions of Bylaws 12.3.1.2, 16.11.2.1, and 16.11.2.3(d)).
94. See id. at 35–38 (detailing extra benefits are violations of Bylaw 12).
95. See id. at 6 (recounting “booster was major donor to institution’s athletics
programs”).
96. See id. at 63 (noting probation spanned from October 22, 2013, to Octo-
ber 21, 2016); see also Andrea Adelson, No Bowl Ban for Miami Hurricanes, ESPN
(Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/9861775/
miami-hurricanes-avoid-bowl-ban-lose-nine-scholarships-part-ncaa-sanctions
[https://perma.cc/FTY7-2K3H] (due to Miami’s self-imposed sanctions and coop-
eration during NCAA investigation, Miami avoided major penalties).
97. See Miami Infractions Report, supra note 85, at 63 (noting football program R
lost scholarships during 2014–2015, 2015–2016, and 2016–2017 academic years);
see also Adelson, supra note 96 (stating former Miami basketball coach, Frank R
Haith, was suspended five games and former assistant basketball coach, Jorge Fer-
nandez, and former assistant football coaches, Clint Hurtt and Aubrey Hill, re-
ceived two-year show-cause penalty).
13
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the NCAA needed to impose harsher penalties on student-athletes
and schools; however, extra benefits did not stop here.98
3. University of Southern California
Despite everything the NCAA did to deter student-athletes
from accepting extra benefits, it was not working.99  After a four-
year investigation by the NCAA, the Committee concluded that
USC’s star running back, Reggie Bush, and his family received extra
benefits from 2004 to 2005.100  Bush and his family accepted “hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars in gifts . . . from sports agents Lloyd
Lake and Michael Michaels.”101  The extra benefits included round-
trip airfare, limousine transportation, weekly payments of at least
$1,500, and hotel accommodations.102  Bush also entered into an
agreement with an agent to establish a sports agency featuring
him.103
In the summer of 2010, the Committee determined this was a
major violation of Bylaws 12 and 16.104  Bush and his family violated
Bylaws 12 and 16 when Bush entered into an agreement with an
agent and when they accepted cash, airfare, and transportation.105
98. See supra notes 85–97 and accompanying text (discussing extra benefits R
student-athletes accepted); see also infra notes 99–119 and accompanying text (ob- R
serving other extra benefit violations)
99. For a summary of previous sanctions imposed on institutions and two-
tiered penalty structure, see supra notes 65–97 and infra notes 100–110 and accom- R
panying text.
100. See Kane, supra note 1, at 132 (noting Bush and his family began receiv- R
ing extra benefits beginning in December 2004).
101. Yost, supra note 3 (discussing extra benefits violations at USC surround- R
ing Bush); see also Charles Robinson & Jason Cole, Cash and Carry, YAHOO! SPORTS
(Sept. 15, 2016), https://sports.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/news?slug=ys-bush-
probe [https://perma.cc/L6RV-XLMY] (noting Bush’s current marketing agent
Mike Ornstein and one of his employees also provided extra benefits).
102. See Robinson & Cole, supra note 101 (acknowledging Bush and his family R
accepted $595.20 of round-trip airfare, $250.65 in limousine transportation, suits
for Bush’s stepfather and brother, $1,500 weekly payments to the Bush family,
$623.63 for hotel stay at Venetian Resort & Casino, $1,547.68 for hotel stay at
Manchester Hyatt, $13,000 for Bush to purchase and modify car, $54,000 in rent-
free living for a year, $28,000 to Bush’s family to help settle pre-existing debt, and
thousands of dollars in spending money to Bush and his family); see also Yost, supra
note 3 (noting under NCAA rules, student-athletes can only be paid by a small R
stipend from the university and cannot have contact with an agent until the stu-
dent-athlete declares for the draft).
103. See Report of the National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I Infractions
Committee, supra note 4 (discussing Bush’s involvement with agents). R
104. See id. (discussing characterization of violation); see also Kane, supra note
1, at 119 (acknowledging this was “ among . . . most severe penalties . . .  NCAA had R
handed down since 2002.”).
105. See Report of the National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I Infractions
Committee, supra note 4 (discussing violations of Bylaws 12 and 16); see also NCAA R
14
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Due to these violations, the NCAA barred the football team from
bowl games in 2010 and 2011, forced the football team to vacate all
victories in which Bush participated beginning in 2004 through
2005, and eliminated thirty scholarships over three years.106  In re-
sponse to the penalties, “USC made moves to completely dissociate
itself from Bush, including ‘remov[ing] his jersey from the steps of
the [football stadium]’ and ‘remov[ing] all references to Bush at
the school’s Heritage Hall.’”107  The NCAA was never able to pun-
ish Bush because he left USC before the NCAA issued its sanc-
tions.108  However, Bush returned the Heisman Trophy he received
in 2005 because he failed to comply with the Heisman Trophy bal-
lot.109  These sanctions are some of the most severe ones the NCAA
has applied; however, it proved not to be enough.110
4. University of Tennessee
While the NCAA discovered some extra benefit violations, it
did not discover them all, giving student-athletes the idea they
might be able to get away with accepting extra benefits.111  From
2005 to 2008, Arian Foster accepted extra benefits while playing
football at the University of Tennessee.112  Due to financial con-
straints, Foster accepted money so he did not have to decide be-
MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaw 12.1.2 (asserting Bylaw 12 prohibits college athletes R
from entering into contract with sports agents); id. at Bylaw 16.11.2 (listing imper-
missible benefits).
106. See Zinser, supra note 5 (noting Committee commented USC lack institu- R
tional responsibility and vacated wins included Orange Bowl victory which pro-
duced Trojans’ Bowl Championship Series Title in January 2005); see also Yost,
supra note 3 (noting Todd McNair was also banned from off-campus recruiting for R
one year because NCAA concluded that he knew Bush was taking extra benefits).
107. Jessica Mullican, The Little College Ball Player and the Big Bad Agent, 15 TEX.
TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 253, 264 (2013) (alternation in original) (quoting Yost, supra
note 3) (noting steps USC took to remove Bush from its campus). R
108. See Kane, supra note 1, at 136 (acknowledging Bush left USC in 2006 for R
NFL).
109. See id. at 136, 136 n.174 (explaining that “[t]he Heisman ballot states,
‘The recipient must be in compliance with the bylaws defining the NCAA student-
athlete,’” and Bush was not in compliance).
110. See Kane, supra note 1, at 119 (acknowledging harshest penalties since R
2002); see also infra notes 112–119 and accompanying text (discussing University of R
Tennessee extra benefit violations).
111. See supra notes 72–82, 86–97, 100–109 and accompanying text (noting R
punishment imposed on University of Wisconsin, University of Miami, and USC);
see also infra notes 113–115 and accompanying text (discussing impermissible bene- R
fits Arian Foster received while playing at University of Tennessee).
112. See Tania Ganguli, Arian Foster Says He Took Benefits, ESPN (Sept. 20,
2013), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/9698504/arian-foster-
says-took-benefits-playing-tennessee-volunteers [https://perma.cc/G359-3ZZR]
(discussing Arian Foster accepting benefits).
15
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tween paying rent and buying food.113  In one circumstance, when
Foster had no food and no money, he called his coach and said,
“[e]ither you give us some food or I’m gonna do something stu-
pid.”114  In response, the coach bought Foster and three others fifty
tacos.115  Foster was never punished for receiving extra benefits
while in college because it was not publicly known until he was play-
ing in the National Football League (NFL).116  However, the Com-
mittee would have likely found Foster violated Bylaw 16 when he
accepted cash and food from individuals and coaches, and the
Committee would have punished him under the two-tiered penalty
structure.117  The two-tiered penalty structure and sanctions were
not enough to deter student-athletes from accepting extra bene-
fits.118  The next step the NCAA needed to take was changing the
penalty structure.119
B. Four-Tiered Penalty System
In 2010, the NCAA began to discuss changing the two-tiered
penalty structure.120  The panel discussed increasing the punish-
ment from athletes paying fines for losing their college eligibility to
113. See Arian Foster Admits in Documentary He Took Money at Tennessee, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, http://www.si.com/football/2013/09/20/arian-foster-documentary-
comments-about-being-paid-tennessee [https://perma.cc/LY3X-WV2B] (last vis-
ited Jan. 28, 2016) (reporting Foster received money); see also John Taylor, Arian
Foster Says He Accepted ‘40, 50 Grand’ from Vols Boosters, NBC SPORTS (Jan. 30, 2015,
2:19 PM), http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/01/30/arian-foster-says-
he-accepted-40-50-grand-from-vols-boosters/ [https://perma.cc/U378-3FES] (not-
ing Foster estimated he accepted between $40,000 and $50,000 throughout his
entire college career).
114. Ganguli, supra note 112 (noting Foster saw “nothing wrong” with ac- R
cepting extra benefits).
115. See id. (describing how Foster took food but “never took money from
coaches, but there were always people . . .  to help him financially”).
116. See id. (concluding Foster brought to light violations in a documentary
called Schooled: The Price of College Sports); see also Taylor, supra note 113 (report- R
ing Foster played for University of Tennessee from 2004 to 2008 and documentary
aired in 2013).
117. See Ganguli, supra note 112 (discussing extra benefits Foster accepted); R
see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaw 16.02.3 (noting extra benefits in- R
clude special arrangements by and institutional employee).
118. See supra notes 72–116 and accompanying text (observing two-tiered R
violations).
119. See infra notes 120–140 and accompanying text (discussing change to R
four-tiered penalty structure).
120. See NCAA, Pros Team Up to Stop Improper Benefits Violations, AFRO (Oct. 27,
2010), http://www.afro.com/ncaa-pros-team-up-to-stop-improper-benefits-viola
tions/ [https://perma.cc/4CTT-S8ME] (summarizing “potential post-NCAA pen-
alties” for student-athletes who takes extra benefits).
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suspending players during their rookie season in the NFL.121  The
two-tiered penalty structure faced a lot of criticism because the
“process was inefficient, lacked transparency, and was too pro-
tracted.”122  The NCAA concluded certain major violations punish-
ments “failed to delineate sufficiently between individual and
institutional culpability for infractions.”123  The case that brought
the most criticism to the two-tiered penalty structure was the Uni-
versity of Miami case; however, other cases also revealed gaps in the
penalty structure.124  “These deficiencies threatened the NCAA’s le-
gitimacy and weakened member institutions’ and the public’s trust
in its ability to effectively handle rules violations.”125  The two-tiered
structure was unsuccessful in discouraging violations and holding
violators accountable.126  Therefore, the NCAA created the four-
tiered penalty structure to respond to the criticism and “restore
trust in the [NCAA’s] ability to fairly and efficiently govern Division
I intercollegiate athletics.”127
In 2013, the NCAA, enacted a new four-tiered penalty structure
in order to focus on “conduct breaches that seriously undermine or
threaten the integrity of the NCAA Constitution.”128  The new struc-
ture was formatted to “get rid of the risk/reward analysis that has
121. See id. (discussing guideline that would cause student-athletes who lost
their college eligibility for taking improper benefits from agents to pay fines prior
to entering NFL and suspending players six to eight games during their rookie
season in NFL for taking improper benefits from agents).  Mike Slive, president of
the NCAA’s Southeastern Conference, stated, “our intent is not to eliminate NCAA
oversight of agent issues, but rather modify the NCAA’s philosophical basis for
these rules from enforcement to an assistance-based model.” Id.  He further
stated, “dealing with improper agent conduct has been a challenge for a long time,
not only for college athletes, but also for the many agents who try to follow the
rules.” Id.
122. Timothy Davis & Christopher T. Hairston, Majoring in Infractions: The
Evolution of the National Collegiate Athletic Association Enforcement, 92 OR. L. REV. 979,
990 (2014) (discussing change from two-tiered penalty structure to four-tiered
penalty structure).
123. Id. at 1002 (noting four-tiered penalty structure “will provide member
institutions and involved individuals with better notice of infractions, and the level
of seriousness assigned infractions, for which they will be held accountable if
NCAA Bylaws are violated”).
124. See id. at 984 (discussing cases that brought criticism to two-tiered penalty
structure).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 985–86 (explaining reasoning for four-tiered penalty structure).
127. Id. The two-tiered penalty structure failed to incentivize institutions and
coaches to comply and encourage student-athletes to comply with the rules.  Crit-
ics argued individuals would engage in a risk-reward analysis to determine whether
the benefits out weighted the violations under the two-tiered penalty structure. See
id. at 986, 1018 (discussing reasons NCAA enacted four-tiered penalty structure).
128. New Violation Structure, NCAA (Aug. 1, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://
www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/new-violation-structure
17
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tempted people . . . to break the rules in the hopes that either they
won’t get caught or that the consequences won’t be very harsh if
they get caught.”129  The NCAA created a clearer “if you do this,
then you can expect that” penalty structure by creating a structure
that lays out the consequences for various types of violations.130
The four-tiered structure also holds those who break the rules
“more accountable for their actions.”131
Level I violations of the four-tiered structure address “severe
breach of conduct.”132  These violations “seriously undermine[ ] or
threaten[ ] the integrity of the NCAA.”133  Violations include a “sig-
nificant recruiting or competitive advantage” and a “significant im-
permissible benefit.”134  Level II violations are a “significant breach
[https://perma.cc/NB5W-X298].  See also Brown, supra note 16 (discussing how R
“penalty guidelines show potential rule-breakers there is no reward for the risk”).
The new enforcement structure targets improving the enforcement pro-
cess in three significant ways.  First, a four-tiered penalty structure de-
signed to focus primarily on conduct that seriously undermines and/or
threatens the integrity of the NCAA will replace the current two-tiered
‘major/secondary’ distinction.  Second, the enforcement process will be-
come more open and expedited.  Last, the new process will place a
greater emphasis on head coach accountability, as well as shared sense of
responsibility to uphold the core values of the NCAA.
Casey C. Kannenberg, The New NCAA Enforcement Model, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://
www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice
_series/the_new_ncaa_enforcement_model.html [https://perma.cc/YK8R-P78Y]
(last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
129. Gary Brown, Board Adopts Tougher, More Efficient Enforcement Program,
NCAA (Oct. 30, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/news/board-adopts-tougher-more-efficient-enforcement-program [https:/
/perma.cc/R45U-4H7U]. See also Brown, supra note 16 (discussing Enforcement R
Working Group trying to make strong and “clearer ‘if you do this, then you can
expect that’ model for violations and penalties”).  The Enforcement Working
Member Group consisted of thirteen members composed of presidents, athletic
directors, commissioners, and others. Id.
130. Brown, supra note 16 (declaring NCAA needed to create “stiffer and R
more predictable penalties”).
131. Enforcement Model Changes Endorsed, NCAA (Aug. 3, 2012, 9:17 AM),
http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2012-08-02/enforcement-model-chan
ges-endorsed [https://perma.cc/PWR7-SUTW] (detailing changes from two-
tiered penalty structure to four-tiered penalty structure).
132. Violation Structure, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/En
forcementHandout%20-%20Violation%20Structure.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7H
D-2VYA] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016)  (explaining “Level I and Level II violations are
resolved by Committee on Infractions . . . Level III violations are resolved by en-
forcement staff, . . . [and] Level IV violations are processed by conference offices
without involvement by NCAA”).
133. Enforcement Model Changes Endorsed, supra note 131 (determining Level I R
violations are highest violations).
134. Id. (explaining multiple violations from other category may collectively
become Level I violation and individual conduct that is unethical may be Level I
violation, even if institution violations are not classified in this category).
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of conduct.”135  Violations include “minimal to significant recruit-
ing or competitive advantage[s], . . . minimal to significant imper-
missible benefit[s,] or . . . a pattern of systemic violations in a
particular area.”136  Level III violations are “isolated or limited in
nature.”137  Violations include “no more than a minimal recruiting,
competitive, or other advantage” and a “minimal impermissible
benefit.”138  Level IV violations are “incidental issue[s].”139  Viola-
tions are “minor infraction[s] that [are] inadvertent and isolated,
technical in nature and result[ ] in a negligible, if any, competitive
advantage.”140
1. Syracuse University
The NCAA put its new penalty structure to the test when Syra-
cuse University’s basketball and football players accepted extra ben-
efits from a booster and a Syracuse staff member from 2001 to
2011.141  On at least five occasions, a Syracuse staff member pro-
vided two student-athletes with transportation that did not fit the
definition of “local,” as defined in the NCAA Bylaws.142  Between
2002 to 2003 and 2006 to 2007, a booster provided or arranged
135. Id. (stating this is second highest violation).
136. Id. (noting multiple violations from less serious levels may collectively be
considered Level II violation and some individual conduct that is unethical or dis-
honest may be Level I violation, even if institutions violations are not classified in
this category).
137. Id. (noting Level III violations are second lowest violation).
138. Id. (explaining multiple Level IV violations collectively may be consid-
ered Level III violations).
139. Id. (stating Level IV violations are lowest violations).
140. Id. (noting “Level IV infractions generally will not impact eligibility”).
141. See, e.g., NCAA COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC
INFRACTIONS DECISION 1 (2015) [hereinafter SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY INFRACTIONS DE-
CISION], available at http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Syracuse%20Final
%20Public%20Infractions%20Decision%20%28Corrected%29.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2DZ7-8QS9] (announcing punishment imposed on Syracuse University
by NCAA). See also Nate Mink, NCAA Investigation: Syracuse Basketball, Football Viola-
tions Involve Extra Benefits, ESPN Report Says, SYRACUSE.COM (last updated Oct. 23,
2014, 11:41 PM), http://www.syracuse.com/orangebasketball/index.ssf/2014/10/
ncaa_investigation_syracuse_mens_basketball_football_programs_alleged_viola
tions.html [https://perma.cc/V78D-HEXE] (discussing infractions report from
NCAA); Timeline: NCAA Releases Details of Syracuse Infractions Case, DEMOCRAT &
CHRONICLE (Mar. 6, 2015, 1:16 PM), http://www.democratandchronicle.com/
story/sports/college/2015/03/06/syracuse-infractions-case-timeline/24502985/
[https://perma.cc/RS6F-D2JQ] (detailing timeline of Syracuse infractions).
142. See SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 141, at 12–13. R
In 2004, an assistant men’s basketball coach drove a student-athlete forty-five miles.
In the spring of 2005, a football student-athlete was provided round trip transpor-
tation on four occasions totaling 128 miles by an institutions football academic
support employee. See id. at 13.
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transportation, over 750 miles, for student-athletes.143  The booster
also provided student-athletes with money from a bank account reg-
istered for a YMCA.144  In total, the booster provided five student-
athletes with twenty-one checks, ranging from $100 to $3,100, total-
ing $8,335.145  Further, the booster provided fast food meals to a
student-athlete.146
On March 6, 2015, the Committee determined Syracuse vio-
lated Bylaw 16.147  The student-athletes violated this Bylaw when
five student-athletes accepted cash, transportation, and food from a
representative and Syracuse staff member.148  Because the viola-
tions straddled the old penalty structure and the new penalty struc-
ture, the Committee decided to conduct a penalty analysis under
both penalty structures and implemented the less stringent struc-
ture.149  As a result, the NCAA placed Syracuse on a five-year proba-
tion and required Syracuse football to vacate all wins from multiple
academic years.150  Additionally, the men’s basketball program lost
three scholarships multiple academic years.151  Finally, the NCAA
suspended the men’s head basketball coach, Jim Boeheim, for the
first nine conference games of the 2015–2016 season.152  The
143. See id. at 12 (discussing extra benefits received by student-athletes).
144. See id. at 10 (noting representative opened bank account around the
time Syracuse accepted and “allowed him to be embedded in the institution’s
men’s basketball and football program”).
145. See id. at 10–13.  Syracuse’s athletics department had summer jobs at the
YMCA for basketball and football student-athletes.  The student-athletes and the
representatives could not provide information regarding the kind of work actually
performed or the rate the student-athletes were paid.  In another instance, the
student-athletes’ checks “did not coincide with YMCA related events.” Id.  Finally,
the YMCA was unable to pay the student-athletes and the representative believed
the student-athletes should be paid. See id.
146. See id. (discussing payment of student-athletes for their work at YMCA).
147. See id. at 30–31 (noting all violations were Level III violations that collec-
tively became Level II violation).
148. See id. at 30 (explaining representative violated Bylaw 16 when they pro-
vided student-athletes with payment for volunteer work at YMCA).  Also, Bylaw 16
expressly identifies transportation from a booster as a prohibited benefit.  In addi-
tion, Bylaw 16 prohibits institutional staff members from providing non-local trans-
portation. See id.
149. See, e.g., id. at 29–62 (acknowledging case involved Level I, Level II, and
Level III violations).
150. See id. at 62–69 (noting vacations include regular season competition,
conference tournaments, and NCAA postseason competition).  Syracuse was
forced to vacate wins from the academic years of 2004–2005, 2005–2006,
2006–2007, 2010–2011, and 2011–2012 in men’s basketball and 2004–2005,
2005–2006, and 2006–2007 in football. See id.
151. See id. at 2–3 (reporting men’s basketball lost scholarships during
2015–2016, 2016–2017, 2017–2018, and 2018–2019 academic years).
152. See id. at 2–3, 65 (discussing punishment imposed on Syracuse’s coach by
NCAA).
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NCAA was unsuccessful in deterring extra benefits under the new
penalty structure because the sanctions were still not harsh enough
to deter student-athletes from accepting extra benefits.153
2. Wichita State University
The NCAA’s reaction to Wichita State’s violations exemplify le-
nient sanctions.154  From 2011 to 2013, Wichita State’s baseball
team accepted extra benefits.155  During these years, “twenty-one
baseball players purchased shoes, clothing, hunting gear, and other
non-athletics items for a total of $7,594.18, using [a] fifty percent
discount.”156  Athletes received these discounts through an account
set up by the institution’s athletics apparel provider and adminis-
tered by Shelly Wombacher, a former baseball administrative
assistant.157
On January 29, 2015, the Committee categorized the violations
of Bylaw 16 as Level II under the four-tiered penalty structure.158
The NCAA implemented the four-tiered penalty structure in this
case because the breaches occurred both before and after October
30, 2012, and the NCAA processed the violation after August 1,
2013.159  Student-athletes violated Bylaw 16 when they ordered dis-
counted items through the apparel account controlled by
Wombacher.160  Due to these violations, the NCAA placed the
153. For a discussion of violations at Wichita State University, see infra notes
155–161 and accompanying text. R
154. For a discussion of violations at Wichita State University and subsequent
penalties, see infra notes 155–161 and accompanying text. R
155. See Paul Suellentrop, NCAA Puts Wichita State Baseball on Probation; Team
Vacates Victories, THE KANSAS CITY STAR (Jan. 29, 2015, 12:59 PM), http://www.kan
sascity.com/sports/college/article8570213.html [https://perma.cc/WNQ5-BLYF]
(stating Wichita State also was charged with failure to monitor); see Brown, supra
note 16 (noting four-tiered penalty structure was implemented in 2013). R
156. Suellentrop, supra note 155 (internal quotation marks omitted) (observ- R
ing NCAA rules allow athletes to purchase items related to their sport).
157. See id. (reporting institution’s athletic apparel provider was Under
Armour).
158. See, e.g., NCAA COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY
PUBLIC INFRACTIONS DECISION 1 (2015) [hereinafter WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY IN-
FRACTIONS DECISION], available at http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Wichita
%20State-Infractions%20DecisionPUBLIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HZ9-8J48]
(discussing characterization of violations).
159. See Brown, supra note 16 (concluding violations that occurred before and R
after October 30, 2012, and were processed after August 1, 2013, are subject to
four-tiered penalty structure as long as most of violations occurred after October
30, 2012).
160. See WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 158, at R
14 (acknowledging Wombacher also committed Level III violation when she al-
lowed softball coach from two-year institution to order discounted items for his
team through her account).
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school on a one-year probation, vacated all the wins in which ineli-
gible baseball players competed, and required the school to pay a
$5,000 fine.161  Still, these penalties were not harsh enough on stu-
dent-athletes to deter other student-athletes from considering ac-
cepting extra benefits.162
3. University of Mississippi
Despite all the institution and student-athlete sanctions before
him, Laremy Tunsil, a former football player at the University of
Mississippi, accepted extra benefits from an agent, his coach, and a
teammate’s friend.163  Tunsil received three separate loaner vehi-
cles over a six-month period without paying.164  In addition, Tunsil
received a “four-month interest-free promissory note on a $3,000
down payment for a used vehicle, two nights of lodging at a local
home, an airline ticket purchased by a friend of a teammate, and a
one day use of a rental vehicle.”165  Further, Tunsil spent a night at
a University of Mississippi’s assistant coach’s house.166
The Committee punished Tunsil under the four-tiered penalty
structure for violating Bylaws 12 and 16.167  The NCAA imple-
mented the four-tiered penalty structure because all violations oc-
curred after the four-tiered penalty structure went into effect.168
Tunsil violated Bylaws 12 and 16 when he accepted loaner vehicles,
a promissory note, lodging, airline tickets, and a vehicle from an
161. See id. at 17 (noting $5,000 fine was self-imposed by Wichita State).
162. See infra notes 163–174 and accompanying text (recounting violations at R
University of Mississippi).
163. See Sam Cooper, NCAA Finds Ole Miss OL Laremy Tunsil Accepted Extra Ben-
efits, YAHOO! SPORTS (Oct. 12, 2015, 10:33 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/
ncaaf-dr-saturday/ncaa-finds-ole-miss-ol-laremy-tunsil-accepted-extra-benefits-
023316546.html [https://perma.cc/93P9-ZKQ5] (reporting Tunsil was not forth-
coming during the NCAA investigation); NCAA Decision on Laremy Tunsil An-
nounced, OLE MISS SPORTS (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.olemisssports.com/sports/
m-footbl/spec-rel/101215aae.html [https://perma.cc/5P43-7QN3] (discussing
NCAA punishment on Tunsil).
164. See Cooper, supra note 163 (listing extra benefits Tunsil received). R
165. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. See Sources: Ole Miss Football Cited in 13 of 28 Rules Violations by NCAA,
ESPN (Feb. 10, 2016), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/1474
9886/21ississippi-football-program-cited-13-28-rules-violations-ncaa [https://
perma.cc/P6QV-RCK7] (noting five violations involved Tunsil).
167. See Brown, supra note 16 (discussing four-tiered penalty structure); see R
also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaw 12.1.2 (prohibiting student-athletes R
from taking benefits from agents); id. at Bylaw 16.11.2 (listing of impermissible
extra benefits which include, but are not limited to, transportation, signing a note,
and money loan).
168. See Brown, supra note 16 (observing NCAA implemented four-tiered pen- R
alty structure on August 1, 2013).
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agent, his coach, and a teammate’s friend.169  The NCAA punished
Tunsil with a seven game suspension, ordered him to pay the value
of the extra benefits to charity, perform community service, and
make a vehicle down payment.170
However, the NCAA did not discover all the extra benefits
Tunsil accepted while playing at the University of Mississippi.171  Af-
ter leaving the University of Mississippi, Tunsil admitted to ac-
cepting additional extra benefits that the NCAA did not discover
during their investigation.172  Tunsil accepted money from the Uni-
versity of Mississippi’s assistant athletic director John Miller for rent
and for Tunsil’s mother’s $305 electric bill.173  Here, not only did
past penalties not deter Tunsil, but the NCAA did not find all the
extra benefits in its investigation.174
C. Agents
In an attempt to regulate contacts between agents and student-
athletes, the state and the government created two acts: the Uni-
form Athlete Agents Act (UAAA) and the Sports Agent Responsibil-
ity and Trust Act (SPARTA).175  Both of these acts prevent agents
169. See supra notes 163–166 and accompanying text (reporting extra benefits R
Tunsil received from agent and friends)
170. See Cooper, supra note 163 (discussing punishment imposed by NCAA); R
see also Jeff Gray, Ole Miss’ Laremy Tunsil Suspended 7 Games, Will Be Back for Texas
A&M, SB NATION (Oct. 12, 2015, 10:09 PM), http://www.redcuprebellion.com/
2015/10/12/9506037/laremy-tunsil-ncaa-suspension-investigation-return-mem
phis-seven-games [https://perma.cc/QV7E-DCV8] (noting six games he sat out
prior to NCAA’s decision, counted towards suspension).
171. See Mark Schlabach, Laremy Tunsil Says He Took Money from Coach at Ole
Miss, ESPN (Apr. 29, 2016), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/15
424437/2016-nfl-draft-laremy-tunsil-admits-taking-cash-ole-miss-rebels-coach
[https://perma.cc/BT2K-FCA6] (discussing extra benefits Tunsil accepted while
playing football at University of Mississippi).
172. See id. (reporting that when asked whether Tunsil accepted money from
coach, Tunsil responded, “I’d have to say yeah.”).
173. See id. (considering extra benefits Tunsil accepted that NCAA did not
find in their investigation).  Just prior to the 2016 NFL Draft, somebody hacked
Tunsil’s Instagram account and posted a screenshot of a text conversation showing
Tunsil requesting money from John Miller. See id.
174. See supra notes 163–173 and accompanying text (summarizing violations R
by Tunsil).
175. See Michael L. Martin, It’s Not a Foul Unless the Ref Blows the Whistle: How to
Step Up Enforcement of the UAAA and SPARTA, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 209, 210 (2012)
(arguing how UAAA and SPARTA helps eliminate contacts between agents and
student-athletes); see also UNIFORM ATHLETE AGENTS ACT (2000) [hereinafter
UAAA], available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/athlete_agents/
uaaa_finalact_2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/DHW4-2WVR] (discussing UAAA act);
149 Cong. Rec. H3620-02 (daily ed. May 1, 2003) (noting SPARTA does not sup-
plement state law).
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from “trick[ing] or brib[ing] student-athletes into signing an
agency contract.”176  The UAAA, state law, and SPARTA, federal
law, both have state and political support.177
In 2000, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws (“NCCUSL”) ratified the UAAA into legislation to
regulate agents.178  In 2015, the NCCUSL approved changes to the
UAAA to strengthen the act.179  The NCCUSL created the UAAA to
“govern[ ] relations among student-athletes, athlete agents, and ed-
ucational institutions.”180  Currently, there are forty states along
with the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands that have
adopted the UAAA.181  The act “imposes significant disclosure, re-
gistration, and record-keeping requirements on athlete agents.”182
The UAAA prohibits agents from “intentionally initiat[ing] contact
with a student-athlete” unless the agent is registered under this act,
“predat[ing] or postdat[ing] an agency contract,” and “provid[ing]
materially false or misleading information” when registering or re-
176. See Martin, supra note 175, at 210 (noting both agent and student-athlete R
can face civil liability).
177. See id. (explaining UAAA has political support from United States Con-
gress and states that adopt it and SPARTA has political support from United States
Congress).
178. See Need for Benefits of the Uniform Athlete Agents Act, NCAA, http://
www.ncaa.org/enforcement/agents-and-amateurism/need-and-benefits-uniform-
athlete-agents-act-uaaa [https://perma.cc/QV6M-N5CY] (last visited Jan. 28,
2016) (discussing problems of agents not being “readily identified” to student-ath-
letes and “lack of uniformity” among states).
179. See Revisions to Sports Agent Act that Protects NCAA Athletes Get Approved,
ESPN (July 15, 2015), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/13263390
/law-commission-approves-changes-strengthen-uniform-athlete-agents-act [https:/
/perma.cc/ZX4Y-G76J] (describing reason for amending UAAA was because many
states amended old act and it was “not as uniform as it should be”).
180. Athlete Agents Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.
org/Act.aspx?title=athlete%20Agents%20Act [https://perma.cc/62GF-SDV4] (ex-
plaining act “protects the interests of student athletes and academic institutions by
regulating the activities of the athlete agents”).
181. See Revisions to Sports Agent Act that Protects NCAA Athletes Get Approved,
supra note 179 (noting “structure and penalties can vary from state to state”). R
182. Athlete Agents Act Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws
.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=athlete%20Agents%20Act [https://perma.cc/65C4-
DF5A] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016).
The act requires agents to disclose their training, experience, and educa-
tion, whether they or an associate have been convicted of a felony or
crime of moral turpitude, have been administratively or judicially deter-
mined to have made false or deceptive representations, have had their
agent’s license denied, suspended, or revoked in any state, or have been
the subject or cause of any sanction, suspension, or declaration of
ineligibility.
Id.
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newing registration under the act.183  Further, the act requires the
agent to inform the school before contacting athletes or their fam-
ily and friends.184  The act attempts to prevent misconduct by
agents by imposing civil and criminal penalties for violations of the
act.185  Under Section 15 of the UAAA, a violator is guilty of a mis-
demeanor or felony and, if convicted, is punished based on state
laws.186  Additionally, the act establishes civil remedies for educa-
tional institutions damaged by a student-athlete’s or an agent’s
violations.187
SPARTA is the “federal backstop” for the UAAA.188  SPARTA
“protects student-athletes by making it illegal for sports agents to
entice student-athletes with false or misleading information,
promises, or representations in order to lure them into a con-
tract.”189  SPARTA prohibits agents from “directly or indirectly re-
cruit[ing] or solicit[ing] a student-athlete to enter into an agency
contract,” prohibits agents from allowing student-athletes to enter
into an agency contract without first warning the student-athlete
that they may lose their eligibility, and prohibits “predat[ing] or
postdat[ing] an agency contract.”190  If an agent violates this law,
the agent is subject to monetary damages.191
1. Agent Terry Watson
A notable agent who violated the UAAA and SPARTA is Terry
Watson.192  In 2010, Watson, a Georgia-based agent, provided
“thousands of dollars in cash and benefits” to three former Univer-
183. Id. (noting agent also “may not refuse or willfully fail to retain or permit
inspection of required records” or “fail to notify a student athlete (prior to sign-
ing) that signing an agency contract may make the student ineligible to participate
as a student athlete in that sport”).
184. See Revisions to Sports Agent Act that Protects NCAA Athletes Get Approved,
supra note 179 (reporting this was an addition in the updated act). R
185. See UAAA, supra note 175 (discussing punishment imposed on agents R
when violating the Uniform Athlete Agent Act).
186. See id. § 15 (discussing UAAA).
187. See id. at Prefatory Note (considering civil remedies available to the educa-
tional institution).
188. See 149 Cong. Rec. H3620-02 (daily ed. May 1, 2003) (determining
SPARTA does not supplement state law).
189. Id. (explaining SPARTA is used to “protect student-athletes when they
travel to other states”).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 7802(a) (2004) (discussing prohibited activities under
SPARTA).
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 7804 (2004) (discussing actions taken by states for violat-
ing SPARTA).
192. See Revisions to Sports Agent Act that Protects NCAA Athletes Get Approved,
supra note 179 (discussing agents who violated the act). R
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sity of North Carolina football players: Marvin Austin, Greg Little,
and Robert Quinn.193  The North Carolina UAAA “prohibits ille-
gally luring collegiate athletes into contracts by providing them
money, gifts, or other items of value.”194  Any agent who violates
this provision is guilty of a Class I felony.195  Watson “allegedly at-
tempted to induce” Austin, Little and Quinn “into signing an
agency contract with him.”196  Austin received $2,000 in cash.197
Watson provided Little with $20,457.24 in benefits, including
$18,200 in cash, to cover two airline tickets to Florida and a hotel
room.198  Quinn received $1,525.45 of benefits, which included
$100 in cash, two airline tickets to Florida, and a hotel room.199
The grand jury indicted Watson on fourteen felony counts based
on Athlete Agent Inducement and Felony Obstruction of Justice.200
This crime is a Class I felony with a possible penalty of fifteen
months incarceration per count of athlete-agent related charges
and thirty months in jail for obstruction of justice.201  He also faced
civil penalties up to $25,000.202  Despite the UAAA and SPARTA in
193. Id.  See As Part of UNC Probe, Former College Player Indicted for Breaking Sports
Agent Law, FOX SPORTS (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.foxsports.com/college-foot
ball/story/in-north-carolina-football-probe-former-player-indicted-for-breaking-
sports-agent-law-083115 [https://perma.cc/J8VB-JBZF] (reporting UNC tutor was
also charged but charges were later dropped).
194. As Part of UNC Probe, Former College Player Indicted for Breaking Sports Agent
Law, supra note 193 (reviewing North Carolina UAAA). R
195. See D’Bria Bradshaw, North Carolina Sports Agent Scandal Receives New Date
for Hearing, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (June 24, 2014), http://sportsagentblog.com/
2014/06/24/north-carolina-sports-agent-scandal-receives-new-date-for-hearing/
[https://perma.cc/K6L4-DXMP] (reporting on penalty for violating UAAA in
North Carolina).
196. Darren Heitner, Football Agent Terry Watson Facing 14 Felony Counts for Vio-
lating North Carolina Athlete Agent Law, FORBES (Oct. 9, 2013, 3:04 PM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2013/10/09/football-agent-terry-watson-facing-
14-felony-counts-for-violating-north-carolina-athlete-agent-law/#64d26e001337
(analyzing reasons Watson provided benefits to UNC players).
197. See Sports Agent Indicted in North Carolina, USA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2013, 5:57
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/acc/2013/10/09/georgia-
agent-terry-watson-arrested-in-north-carolina-agents-probe/2953075/ [https://
perma.cc/66V6-C2KH] (discussing benefits Watson provided to Austin).
198. See id. (discussing benefits Watson provided to Little).
199. See id. (discussing benefits Watson provided to Quinn).
200. See Heitner, supra note 196 (noting nine charges focused on Little, three R
charges focused on Quinn, and one charge focused on Austin).
201. See Cullen Browder, Derek Medlin & Aaron Schoonmaker, Sports Agent
Terry Watson Faces 14 Felony Counts in UNC Scandal, WRAL SPORTS FAN (last updated
Oct. 10, 2013) http://www.wralsportsfan.com/sports-agent-connected-to-unc-scan
dal-charged/12976259/ (noting “individuals with little or no previous criminal re-
cord will likely be subject to probation and/or fines”).
202. See Sports Agent Indicted in North Carolina, supra note 197 (discussing civil R
penalties Watson could face).
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place, Watson took the risk of providing student-athletes with extra
benefits and was reprimanded.203  Watson’s actions prove that the
NCAA must incorporate greater penalties to deter agents from pro-
viding extra benefits.204
2. Agent Josh Luchs
However, the UAAA and SPARTA did not catch every violation
of the rule.205  Josh Luchs is a former sports agent who admitted to
providing benefits to more than thirty former college players.206
Luchs supplied athletes with money, automobiles, bail money, and
various luxuries.207  The first player Luchs provided benefits to was
Kanavis McGhee, a University of Colorado football player.208  Luchs
provided McGhee with $2,500 because McGhee’s mother lost her
job and was behind on rent.209  The Government and state never
punished Luchs under the UAAA or SPARTA.210  Luchs’s informa-
tion did not come to light until his book was published in 2010.211
If the NCAA changes its policies regarding interaction between stu-
dent-athletes and agents, extra benefits violations may possibly
diminish.212
D. How the NCAA Can Deter Extra Benefits
Many college athletes take extra benefits, such as money and
food, because they cannot afford the essentials.213  In addition to
the penalty structure, there are other options for the NCAA to de-
203. See supra notes 193–199 and accompanying text (summarizing Watson R
providing extra benefits to student-athletes).
204. See supra notes 193–202 and accompanying text (acknowledging viola- R
tions by Watson).
205. See infra notes 206–211 and accompanying text (discussing extra benefits R
provided by Luchs to student-athletes).
206. See The ‘Illegal Procedure’ of Paying College Athletes, NPR (Mar. 28, 2012,
11:59 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/28/148610494/the-illegal-procedure-of-
paying-college-athletes (discussing Luchs’s history of providing college athletes
benefits).
207. See id. (discussing ways Luchs provided benefits to college athletes).
208. See id. (reporting Luchs first paid McGhee in 1990).
209. See id. (noting Luchs provided money to McGhee because he believed it
would help “develop a relationship;” however, Luchs ended up not signing him).
210. See id. (explaining Luchs was suspended for rules infraction).
211. See id. (stating Luchs’s book is called Illegal Procedure).
212. See infra notes 213–238 and accompanying text (laying out ways to pre- R
vent extra benefits).
213. See The ‘Illegal Procedure’ of Paying College Athletes, supra note 206 (noting R
Luchs came out with this information after he was no longer an agent).
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ter student-athletes from accepting extra benefits.214  For example,
the NCAA could pay student-athletes.215  Student-athlete compensa-
tion came to light in 2009 when Ed O’Bannon brought a case to
have student-athletes paid for the use of their name, image, or like-
ness.216  In O’Bannon v. NCAA217 a group of current and former
college football and men’s basketball players brought a class action
against the NCAA challenging the NCAA’s restriction on compen-
sation for student-athletes.218  The plaintiffs claimed the NCAA
rules and Bylaws were an “unreasonable restraint of trade,” violat-
ing the Sherman Act.219  The District Court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs, concluding the NCAA’s rules violated the Sherman
Act.220  The District Court concluded student-athletes should re-
ceive compensation, up to $5,000, for the use of their names,
images, and likeness.221  The NCAA appealed the District Court’s
ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.222  The Court of Ap-
peals overturned the District Court’s ruling, concluding the cost of
attendance, not more, is compensation for use of a student-athlete’s
name, image, and likeness.223  The plaintiffs petitioned for a re-
hearing of the case before a larger panel of judges; however, the
Court of Appeals denied the petition.224  Both the NCAA and the
214. See infra notes 216–238 and accompanying text (suggesting ways to pre- R
vent extra benefits).
215. See infra notes 216–238 and accompanying text (explaining paying stu- R
dent-athletes could deter extra benefits).
216. See Ben Strauss, Catching Up with the O’Bannon Ruling, Soon to Go into Ef-
fect, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/sports/
catching-up-with-the-obannon-ruling-soon-to-go-into-effect.html?_r=0 (noting
O’Bannon sued NCAA “for using his name and image in TV broadcasts and video
games”).
217. 7 F.Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d
1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
218. See id. at 962–93 (discussing class action challenging NCAA’s restriction
on compensating men’s football and basketball players).
219. See id. at 963, 971 (noting NCAA “prohibits student-athletes from receiv-
ing ‘financial aid based on athletics ability’ that exceeds the value of a full ‘grant-
in-aid’”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (noting Sherman Act prevents restraint on
trade or commerce among states).
220. See O’Bannon, 7 F.Supp. at 1009 (deciding NCAA violated Sherman Act).
221. See id. at 1008 (acknowledging District Court placed a cap of $5,000 on
compensation to student-athletes).
222. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing
NCAA’s appeal of District Court ruling).
223. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076–77 (determining setting compensation
cap at student-athletes full cost of attendance is less restrictive means to accom-
plishing “NCAA’s legitimate procompetitive purposes”).
224. See Jon Solomon, Judges Deny O’Bannon Petition to Rehear Appeal vs. NCAA,
CBS SPORTS (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/
jon-solomon/25416207/judges-deny-obannon-petition-to-rehear-appeal-vs-ncaa-
[https://perma.cc/HX7V-W8RL] (acknowledging Ninth Circuit issued order stat-
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plaintiffs sought an appeal in the Supreme Court.225  Paying stu-
dent-athletes could decrease the amount of extra benefits student-
athletes accept because student-athletes would “have enough
money to live and actually attend college.”226  For example, student-
athletes could put money towards food rather than asking their
coaches or agents for food, and thus not violate the NCAA By-
laws.227  Student-athletes could also use this money to help their
families.228  For example, if he was being paid, Tunsil could have
paid his mother’s electric bill rather than asking the University of
Mississippi’s assistant athletic director to do so.229  Paying athletes is
one option the NCAA can prevent student-athletes from accepting
extra benefits; however, the NCAA has other options.230
The NCAA also needs to address the issues of student-athletes
interact with agents.231  While the UAAA and SPARTA are in place,
ing “the three judges voted the same way they did on the initial appeal and no
other judge requested a vote for a rehearing”).
225. See Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Asks Supreme Court to Hear O’Bannon Antitrust
Case, USA TODAY (May 13, 2016, 8:02 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/college/2016/05/13/ncaa-asks-supreme-court-hear-obannon-antitrust-
case/84341682/ [https://perma.cc/JMV6-EHCR] (noting Supreme Court has
ability to deny hearing appeal).
226. Reggie Southall, Shouts From the Stands: Why NCAA Athletes Should be Paid,
SWIM SWAM (May 7, 2015), https://swimswam.com/shouts-from-the-stands-why-
ncaa-should-be-paid/ [https://perma.cc/DD79-TERY] (declaring students would
be “more financially stable and happy”); see also Ikeem Boyd, NCAA’s Role in College
Athletics, Stand on Paying Athletes, and Recent Push for a Union, WRITING WORKSHOPS
(Apr. 26, 2014), https://writingworkshops14.wordpress.com/2014/04/26/ncaas-
role-in-college-athletics-stand-on-paying-athletes-and-recent-push-for-a-union/
[https://perma.cc/8QBX-EF4R] (discussing ways NCAA can prevent student-ath-
letes from accepting extra benefits).
227. See Ganguli, supra note 112 (acknowledging Foster accepted food from R
his coach because he could not afford to buy any, a violation of NCAA Bylaws).
228. See Schlabach, supra note 171 (acknowledging Tunsil asked for money R
for his mother’s electric bill); see also The ‘Illegal Procedure’ of Paying College Athletes,
supra note 206 (acknowledging McGhee accepted money to pay for his mother’s R
rent).
229. See Schlabach, supra note 171 (reporting Tunsil took money from assis- R
tant athletic director John Miller).
230. See infra notes 231–238 and accompanying (discussing how monitoring R
student-athlete and agent interactions could prevent extra benefits).
231. See Teddy Mitrosilis, College Football Rules Violations: NCAA Can Help Pre-
vent Player-Agent Misconduct, BLEACHER REPORT (Sept. 15, 2010), http://bleacherre
port.com/articles/463410-ncaa-and-college-football-how-ncaa-can-help-prevent-
player-agent-misconduct [https://perma.cc/YD7Z-R7YE] (discussing how UAAA
attempts to regulate agents but NCAA can do more); see also Robert Gagliardi, Can
the NCAA Realistically Stop Agents?, LARAMIE BOOMERANG (July 22, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.laramieboomerang.com/sports/article_061bebd0-993a-5821-9830-
6e9f4715edca.html [https://perma.cc/L9HA-LA4G] (explaining how working
with agents could benefit NCAA).
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these laws are not always effective.232  Instead of banning agents,
the NCAA should find a way to work with them on its own terms.233
The NCAA may not be able to control “what agents do, but it may
be able to control how players interacts with them.”234  The NCAA
could create a department that controls communication between
players and agents by having agents sign up through the depart-
ment to meet with a player.235  During meetings, the NCAA can
mandate players “to keep a log of conversations they have with
agents.”236  In addition to the penalty structure, UAAA, and
SPARTA, working with agents would just add another layer to
preventing extra benefits.237  This additional protection could pre-
vent agents from sneaking around to speak to student-athletes.238
IV. CONCLUSION
The NCAA has been unsuccessful in its attempts to prevent ex-
tra benefits and protect the integrity of the NCAA.239  Extra bene-
fits are regulated through NCAA rules and state and federal laws.240
Throughout the NCAA’s history, it has tried different penalty struc-
tures to prevent extra benefits.241  The two-tiered penalty structure
became ineffective after multiple student-athletes accepted extra
benefits.242  After shifting to the four-tiered penalty structure, the
232. See supra notes 192–199, 206–210 and accompanying text (recognizing R
agents Watson and Luchs both provided extra benefits to student-athletes).
233. See Gagliardi, supra note 231 (discussing how working with agents “would R
be more advantageous” to the NCAA).
234. Mitrosilis, supra note 231 (acknowledging agents are competing in busi- R
ness world and if there is “a loophole,” they will “exploit it”).
235. See id. (discussing how department will facilitate interactions).
236. Id. (explaining how NCAA can keep track of athlete-agent conversa-
tions).
237. See id. (noting NCAA would be able to regulate interactions).
238. See id. (indicating NCAA could have agent sign up with department then
have student-athlete log conversation).
239. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at Bylaw 12.01.1 (stating in order to R
keep college athletics separate from professional sports, only student-athletes with
amateurism status are eligible to play in college athletics); see also id. at Bylaws 12,
16 (discussing how student-athletes lose eligibility by accepting extra benefits).
240. See id. at Organization of the NCAA Manual (stating NCAA Constitution
and Bylaws govern NCAA); see generally Martin, supra note 175 (discussing UAAA R
and SPARTA).
241. See Note re: New NCAA Division I Enforcement Model, supra note 66 (discuss- R
ing two-tiered penalty structure); Brown, supra note 16 (summarizing four-tiered R
penalty structure)
242. See supra notes 72–77, 85–91, 100–103, 112–115 and accompanying text R
(noting student-athletes at University of Wisconsin, University of Miami, USC, and
University of Tennessee accepted extra benefits).
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penalty structure still proved ineffective.243  Student-athletes real-
ized they could get away with accepting extra benefits and not re-
ceive harsh punishment, causing the penalty structures to become
ineffective.244  Further, state laws and federal laws prevented agents
from providing student-athletes extra benefits.245  These laws were
not effective considering the NCAA, the government, and the states
did not discover agents communicating with student-athletes.246
Despite the NCAA’s best attempts, more can be done to pre-
vent extra benefits.247  In order to resolve the foreseeable viola-
tions, the NCAA will ultimately need to make a change.248  One
possible change would be to pay athletes, allowing athletes to
purchase things they would otherwise receive in violation of the
NCAA Bylaws.249  A second possible change would be working with
agents and student-athletes as a way to closely monitor their interac-
243. See Brown, supra note 16 (acknowledging change to four-tiered structure R
in 2013); see also supra notes 141–174 and accompanying text (noting student-ath- R
letes at Syracuse University, Wichita State University, and University of Mississippi
accepted extra benefits)
244. See supra notes 72–77, 85–91, 100–103, 112–115 and accompanying text R
(acknowledging student-athletes at University of  Wisconsin, University of Miami,
USC, and University of Tennessee accepted extra benefits despite penalty structure
and past sanctions); see also supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text (discuss- R
ing how Arian Foster did not get caught accepting extra benefits); see also supra
notes 141–174 and accompanying text (noting student-athletes at Syracuse Univer- R
sity, Wichita State University, and University of Mississippi accepted extra benefits
despite penalty structure and past sanctions); Schlabach, supra note 171 (acknowl- R
edging NCAA did not discover all of Tunsil’s extra benefits).
245. See Martin, supra note 175, at 211–13 (noting UAAA and SPARTA were R
enacted to prevent agents from “trick[ing] or brib[ing] student-athletes into sign-
ing an agency contract”).
246. See Revisions to Sports Agent Act that Protects NCAA Athletes Get Approved,
supra note 179 (acknowledging Watson provided three student-athletes with extra R
benefits); see also The ‘Illegal Procedure’ of Paying College Athletes, supra note 206 (not- R
ing Luchs provided extra benefits to thirty student-athletes and was never caught
or punished).
247. See supra notes 213–238 and accompanying text (acknowledging NCAA R
can pay student-athletes or regulate agent and student-athlete contact).
248. See supra notes 72–110, 141–172, 192–212 and accompanying text (dis- R
cussing extra benefit violations despite penalty structure and past sanctions)
249. See Southall, supra note 226 (explaining how paying student-athletes may R
prevent them from taking extra benefits).
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tions.250  It is clear these changes could benefit the NCAA in
preventing extra benefits.251
Devon Stauffer*
250. See Gagliardi, supra note 231 (discussing how the NCAA can join forces R
with agents to regulate athlete-agent contact).
251. See Southall, supra note 226 (acknowledging by paying student-athletes R
they would be more financially stable); see also Mitrosilis, supra note 231 (discussing R
regulating student-athlete and agent interactions it can prevent “shady conduct”).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law.  I would like to dedicate this article to my family and friends for their endless
support and encouragement throughout my academic pursuits.  Specifically, I
would like to dedicate this to my parents, Randy and Beth, and my sister, Bailey.
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